Middle-class Imagination and Urban Restructuring in Twenty-first Century Kolkata by Donner, Henrike
N
E
W
 P
E
R
S
P
E
C
T
IV
E
S
 O
N
 T
U
R
K
E
Y
Whose city is it anyway? 
Middle class imagination and 
urban restructuring in twenty-
first century Kolkata
Henrike Donner
Abstract
This article provides an overview of the way in which post-liberalization 
urban restructuring is determined by middle class imaginations and life-
styles in Kolkata, India. It charts how the conjunction between plan-
ning, politics and private investment made middle class hegemony in the 
new urban politics possible, and how the processes that have been set in 
motion create new spatializations according to class through exclusions 
and reformulate citizenship as social relationships are redefined in the 
language of markets. 
Keywords: Middle class, urban space, India, Kolkata, neoliberalism
Introduction 
Today a large number of citizens in urban India would describe them-
selves as being “middle class.” The term is conspicuous in media repre-
sentations and on the street. Everyday conversations, especially in the 
nation’s growing urban centers draw on the category of class to describe 
newly upwardly mobile communities and emerging consumer cultures, 
and media hail the middle class as a growing mass of consumers driving 
economic change. 
From independence up until the 1990s, the notion of a homogenous 
middle class referenced the families of government employees and pro-
fessionals, who consciously fashioned and represented themselves in 
these terms, and whose hegemonic culture stemmed from their involve-
ment with the institutions and politics of the state.1 As Jaffrelot and van 
Henrike Donner, Oxford Brookes University, Department of Social Sciences, Gipsy Lane, Headington, 
Oxford OX3 0BP, h.donner@brookes.ac.uk.
1 See, B.B. Mishra, The Indian Middle Classes: Their Growth in Modern Times (Oxford: Oxford University 
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der Veer have argued, the cult of a “self-assured bourgeois nationalism” 
that marked their shared middle class culture perpetuated the close as-
sociation of these mostly upper-caste, salaried elites with particular life-
styles, as did their involvement with the state sector.2 Gradually, middle 
class self-representations became a significant objective as well as a sub-
jective reality, which is particularly relevant in the case of Bengal, where 
such a self-conscious section “between the rich and the poor” began to 
identify itself as being in the middle in the colonial period and where 
such a notion became hegemonic in political discourses. 
Today, the self-professed middle class(es) in India present a much 
more heterogeneous picture than ever before, and the notion of being 
middle class is no longer solely dependent on access to salaried employ-
ment. With the middle class benefitting disproportionately from eco-
nomic reform and investment by the post-liberalization state, not only 
has the number of those economically well-off grown, liberalization is 
also closely associated with the rise of the middle class as a political pow-
er in India. In the process, the values of the so-called old middle class of 
government servants and professionals had held have come under pres-
sure, and their way of life—the privileges that their close association 
with the state had accrued—is gradually disappearing. Since liberaliza-
tion has kicked in, more and more communities have access to the sites 
and markers of middleclassness, even though they may stem from very 
different economic and social backgrounds and were traditionally ex-
cluded from the kind of status that this label entails. 
These transformations are particularly pertinent in urban areas, 
where, as Fernandes has pointed out, there is nothing new about the 
middle class as an important player in politics, but where the so-called 
new middle class stake their claim to status more exclusively on eco-
nomic standing, the outward sign of which is participation in the rituals 
of consumerism evidenced and experienced within the new spatial order 
of cities across India.
The genealogy of the middle class as a relevant category to describe 
Indian politics and the way in which the middle class figures in narratives 
of social change are intertwined with the discourse around economic re-
form. In the process, excessively economistic perspectives on this section 
of the population fill the media and have also informed a number of 
recent surveys, partly carried out for the purpose of planning and partly 
Press, 1961).
2 Christophe Jaffrelot and Peter van der Veer, “Introduction,” in Patterns of Middle Class Consumption in 
India and China, eds. Christophe Jaffrelot and Peter van der Veer (Delhi: Sage, 2008), 20. 
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to chart the “markets” available for the taking in neoliberal India.3 Social 
scientists, on the other hand, have written excessively about the “culture” 
of this new middle class, utilizing semiotic and post-colonial theory to 
analyze the way in which the discourse about liberalization and middle 
class consumerism has constituted national identity in novel ways.4 
The opening of the formerly protected Indian markets to foreign in-
vestment and an explicit emphasis on state disinvestment through poli-
cies characterized “liberalization,” which kicked in seriously with the sec-
ond wave of reforms from 1991 onwards. The outcomes of these reforms 
have been discussed ever since, with supporters of neoliberal economics 
claiming that the sustained growth of the Indian economy made India a 
player in a globally integrated market and has benefitted large numbers 
of citizens, while opponents emphasize that the reforms only benefit-
ted the “new” middle class and have actually increased disparities and 
thereby created more inequality between the urban poor and the middle 
class, rural and urban areas, and different regions.5 Thus, whilst the self-
regulatory dynamics of markets are expected to ultimately change the 
lives of the entire population, and there is evidence of upward mobil-
ity in certain sections, critics argue that by dismantling the public sec-
tor and encouraging markets in previously strictly regulated and often 
subsidized industries the state has systematically marginalized the poor, 
prioritized the demands of the growing number of affluent citizens, fo-
cused on the development of urban sites rather than the villages, and has 
underdeveloped certain state within the union. 
Regardless of where one stands on the issue of foreign investment 
and economic liberalization, there can be no doubt that the reforms 
changed the life of Indian citizens and promoted new, “neoliberal” poli-
cies across India. These policies came into their own in the 1990s and 
have reshaped the political landscape as the ways in which the relation-
3 For an example of an empirical social science perspective, see E. Sridharan, “The Growth and Sectoral 
Composition of India’s Middle Class: Its Impact on the Politics of Economic Liberalization,” India 
Review 3, no. 4 (2004); for an example of corporate surveys charting the middle class in terms of 
economic indicators see Jonathan Ablett et al., “The ‘Bird of Gold’: The Rise of India’s Consumer 
Markets,” (McKinsey Global Institute, 2007).
4 See, William Mazzarella, Shoveling Smoke: Advertising and Globalization in Contemporary India (Dur-
ham: Duke University Press, 2003); Arvind Rajagopal, “Thinking About the New Middle Class: Gender, 
Advertising and Politics in an Age of Globalisation,” in Signposts: Gender Issues in Post-Independence 
India, ed. Rajeswari Sunder Rajan (Delhi: Kali for Women, 1999); Rupal Oza, The Making of Neoliberal 
India: Nationalism, Gender, and the Paradoxes of Globalization (Delhi: Routledge, 2006).
5 See, for instance Sripad Motiram and Sarma Nayantara, “Polarization, Inequality and Growth: The 
Indian Experience,” Ecineq (2011); and the various chapters in Anthony Heath and Roger Jeffery, eds., 
Diversity and Change in Modern India: Economic, Social and Political Approaches (Oxford Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2010).
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ships between the governed and the government are represented and 
understood have been reworked. 
In the propaganda that accompanied Nehruvian nationalism prevalent 
after independence, development through rational and secular governance 
combined effortlessly with redistribution, materialized in the form of a 
planned economy, an emphasis on economic independence, and subsidies 
for the “poor.” Large-scale industrialization programs were initiated, and in 
some states, West Bengal among them, land reforms were implemented. 
This emphasis on the countryside and industrialization where none had 
existed before fed into the image of India’s development based prosperity 
of her villages, but was in fact driven by a flourishing politics of votebanks, 
the most lucrative of which are even today located in rural areas. But, as 
Khilnani has argued among others, urban politics played an equally deci-
sive role in Indian post-independence politics, albeit a very contested one, 
as the case of Kolkata demonstrates.6 
Situated within the state of West Bengal, Kolkata emerged as a colo-
nial center and enjoyed rapid growth until the 1960s. As a city, its hey-
days were limited—not only did the shift of the colonial administration 
to Delhi make it into a provincial capital, partition robbed it of its hin-
terland and brought millions of refugees to the now Indian part of Ben-
gal, most of whom settled in Kolkata. For decades after independence, 
the city, and with it the state of West Bengal, experienced an economic 
downturn, and, as Chakravorty has suggested, “the liberalization process 
appeared to have been a heaven-sent.”7 By the 1990s, when liberalization 
kicked in, the ruling Left Front had been neglecting the needs of urban-
ites in favor of their rural votebanks from 1977 onwards, and although 
there had been attempts to devise a master plan for “Greater Calcutta” in 
the 1970s, the city had not seen much in the way of urban development, 
regeneration, or large-scale planning apart from the so-called “metro”8 in 
1984. From the 1990s onwards, however, the city began to figure more 
prominently in Left Front politics, as the state government began to in-
vest heavily in urban infrastructure, intending to garner support from a 
new force in post-liberalization India, the middle class consumer citizen, 
in order to stay in power.
6 See Khilnani’s dicussion of the rural-urban divide in foundational myths of Indian politics, Sunil Khil-
nani, The Idea of India (Delhi: Penguin, 2003). 
7 Sanjay Chakravorty, “From Colonial City to Global City? The Far-from-Complete Spatial Transforma-
tion of Calcutta,” in Globalizing Cities: A New Spatial Order?, eds. Peter Marcuse and Ronald van 
Kempen (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999).
8 The Indian cities Delhi, Bombay/Mumbai, Madras/Chennai, Calcutta/Kolkata and Bangalore/Benga-
luru are commonly collectively referred to as “metros.” This denotes a common culture relevant to the 
middle classes as well as shared statistical characteristics.
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Preceding this phrase, urban middle class citizens had challenged the 
consensus about the way in which the state defined “progress” and “de-
velopment” in the post-Nehruvian era more openly, for instance in the 
form of Hindu nationalism, a move against state-ordered secularism, 
and more commonly by criticizing even moderate affirmative action. 
A first glimpse of this new voice in Indian politics was therefore ap-
parent when the recommendation of the so-called Mandal commission 
to increase affirmative action efforts by raising the number of “reserved 
seats” for students from backward communities in government schools, 
colleges and public sector jobs, caused an uproar among middle class 
students. These protests indicated that by now the idea of redistribution 
was refuted by a significant minority of the electorate, and it was appar-
ent that the growing urban middle class was more or less united in its 
hostility to the agenda of development directed towards the “upliftment” 
of the most marginalized sections of society. 
Middle class discontent did initially rise as liberalization policies 
kicked in, when the upper middle class—often congruent here with the 
old middle class that consists of professionals and the upper echelons of 
government servants—saw their traditional privileges threatened by the 
ongoing democratization of politics, while the more numerous but less-
educated lower middle class began to fear too much competition and 
social and financial insecurity.9 These anxieties were particularly pro-
nounced in West Bengal, where a virtual elite of government employees 
had been institutionalized by the Left Front, whose sense of deprivation 
related to the very real possibility of redundancies, loss of pensions and 
other perks and worries about the future of their children.10 But, on the 
whole, the reforms were initially supported whole-heartedly by middle 
class citizens across India, and as the 1990s saw the opening of India’s 
markets to foreign investment, disinvestment in the public sector and 
support for business, export-oriented industries and the burgeoning IT-
related sector as well as the emergent globalized consumer culture were 
fully embraced. 
In urban areas these policies had drastic and visible consequences, 
which are often glossed over in terms of “regeneration” and “urban re-
structuring.” The narratives of the growth in power and size of the In-
dian middle class are closely related to these processes. In the case of 
9 For an overview of Indian politics during the 1990s with special reference to the politics of backward 
communities and the growth of Hindu nationalism see, Stuart Corbridge and John Harriss, Re-Invent-
ing India: Liberalization, Hindu Nationalism and Popular Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 2000).
10 See, Ruchira Ganguly-Scrase and Timothy J. Scrase, Globalization and the Middle Classes in India: The 
Social and Cultural Impact of Neoliberal Reforms (London: Routledge, 2009).
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Bangalore, for example, the rise of IT-related industries transformed a 
former garden city into India’s Silicon Valley and created a whole new 
and iconic middle class subculture centered around specific qualifica-
tions, workplaces, and urbanities classed as modern, rational and de-
sirable.11 Elsewhere, for example in the southern state of Tamil Nadu, 
towns emerged solely on the back of specific industries—in the case of 
Coimbatore and Tiruppur, textiles for export—and this urbanization 
created a local class of newly affluent middle class entrepreneurs from 
specific rural caste backgrounds.12 Here, narratives of mobility and re-
gional history have now become entwined with the new global Indian 
middle class lifestyle, and this has depended more and more on specifi-
cally designed urban settings. 
But it was not only newly urbanized areas that felt the winds of 
change; soon the metros—Chennai, Delhi, Mumbai and Kolkata—
were reordered and reshaped in order to cater to the needs of these life-
styles and to nurture the demands of a growing urban elite.
Thus, the growing literature on the suburbanization of Delhi charts 
how, combining the spin of “a global city” in the wake of the Common-
wealth Games, the demands of these upwardly mobile sections of the 
population drove the planning and execution of urban restructuring, in 
an attempt to create a capital worthy of a leading nation.13 Like in all 
other metros, the completion of this aspiration necessitated the removal 
of the urban poor and their livelihoods from the streets, but in the capi-
11 See, John C. Stallmeyer, Building Bangalore: Architecture and Urban Transformation in India’s Silicon 
Valley (London: Routledge, 2011); Carol Upadhyay, “India’s ‘New Middle Class’ and the Globalising 
City: Software Professionals in Bangalore, India,” in The New Middle Classes: Globalizing Lifestyles, 
Consumerism and Environmental Concern, eds. Hellmuth Lange and Lars Meier (Dordrecht: Springer, 
2009); Nicolas Nisbett, “The Internet, Cybercafes and the New Social Spaces of Bangalorean Youth,” 
in Locating the Field: Space, Place and Context in Anthropology, eds. Simon M. Coleman and Peter Col-
lins (Oxford: Berg, 2006).
12 See, Sharad Chari, Fraternal Capital: Peasant-Worker, Self-Made Man and Globlization in Provincial India 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004); Geert de Neve, “Keeping It in the Family: Work, Edu-
cation and Gender Hierarchies among Tiruppur’s Capitalist Industrialists,” in Being Middle Class in 
India: A Way of Life, ed. Henrike Donner (London: Routledge, 2011). 
13 In Delhi, urban restructuring has been closely related to the legal and symbolic role of a capital and 
has resulted in massive slum relocations and squatter evictions which were driven by a politics of 
accommodation vis-à-vis an affluent urban middle class. See for instance, Amita Baviskar, “Between 
Violence and Desire: Space, Power and Identity in the Making of Metropolitan Delhi,” International 
Social Science Journal 55, no. 1 (2003); “Spectacular Events, City Spaces and Citizenship: The Com-
monwealth Games in Delhi,” in Urban Navigations: Politics, Space and the City in South Asia, eds. Jona-
than Shapiro Anjaria and Colin McFarlane (Delhi: Routledge, 2010); Ursula Rao, “Making the Global 
City: Urban Citizenship on the Margins of Delhi,” Ethnos 74, no. 4 (2010); Christiane Brosius, India’s 
Middle Class: New Forms of Urban Leisure, Consumption and Prosperity (Delhi: Routledge, 2010); Shoma 
Munshi, “Yeh Dil Maange More ... : Television and Consumer Choices in a Global City,” in Patterns of 
Middle Class Consumption in India and China, eds. Christophe Jaffrelot and Peter van der Veer (Delhi: 
Sage, 2008). 
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tal special legislation enabled the state government (Delhi is governed 
independently from any of the states) to create a central area free of 
slums, hawkers, and informal markets. Furthermore, like in other glob-
al cities, expensive infrastructure was provided to build satellite cities, 
which consisted of large residential areas for middle class residents and 
separate business districts housing the booming enterprises that liberal-
ization has kicked off. The development of these townships demanded 
the provision of roads for private transport and the relocation of “pol-
luting” industries, communities, and activities outside the city proper, 
within which new legal provisions made the presence of poor residents 
and their trade a criminal offence. 
The new spatial divisions created in India’s metropolitan areas were 
closely related to class, as the spatial segregation worked out for Delhi 
indicates. However, it is equally apparent in the case of Bombay/Mum-
bai, where the transformation of the vast textile mill areas into up-mar-
ket residential and commercial sites commenced in the 1990s and cre-
ated urban spatial relations driven by middle class lifestyles and capital 
flows generated in the wake of liberalization.14 What is apparent here 
as elsewhere is that the restructuring of Indian cities into havens for 
property speculators and the redefinition of rights to the city were based 
on the decline of industries, and in its wake the marginalization of en-
tire neighborhoods and the working-class population. What applied to 
Mumbai and Delhi became soon apparent in other cities as well, namely 
that urban politics after liberalization would be driven by the needs of a 
global middle class of Indian origin and that this new scenario defined 
citizenship to the exclusion of the urban poor, often in terms of middle 
class livelihoods and consumption practices through the language of 
“needs,” “demands,” and “markets.” 
The research on which this article is based consists of a series of ex-
tensive fieldwork stays in Calcutta/Kolkata, the earliest being a two-
year period between 1995 and 1997, the latest six weeks in December 
2011/January 2012. During those research stays I initially worked with 
middle class residents of Taltala, a Central Calcutta neighborhood, and 
14 On Mumbai, see Arjun Appadurai, “Spectral Housing and Urban Cleansing: Notes on Millennial 
Mumbai,” Public Culture 12, no. 3 (2000) in which Appadurai discusses how the availability of cash 
due to changing regulations of India’s financial markets in conjunction with local histories of eth-
nic segregation and communal violence provided the reasoning behind the imaginary restoration of 
Mumbai, leaving Bombay behind. Leela Fernandes highlights how the processes of disinvestment, 
flexibilization of capital and restructuring of the labor force have affected the emergence of a “new” 
middle class as a reference group for planners, investors and citizens alike. See Leela Fernandes, 
India’s New Middle Class: Democratic Politics in an Era of Economic Reform (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2006).
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later on with a cluster of households in a Southern neighborhood (year-
long stays in 1999-2000 and 2002-3, respectively), who all stemmed 
originally from East Bengal. In the course of my later research projects, 
the focus was not so much on a specific area, and so I interviewed and 
regularly met with other middle class families, more often than not visit-
ing their homes on consecutive occasions. During the shorter periods of 
fieldwork, I began to document the changes that the cityscape is under-
going and took advantage of the endless opportunities to discuss these 
changes and their effects on the lives of my interlocutors with middle 
class Kolkatans. The methods employed throughout were those appro-
priate for an anthropological study of urban change, namely interviews 
and participant observation, complemented by visual and written sourc-
es related to the subject. 
Urban space
When asked about the changes that urban India is undergoing, my in-
terlocutors, who are all middle class citizens of Kolkata, would from 
the mid-1990s onwards point out that the new infrastructure—such 
as fly-overs, highways, and bridges—indexed the changing era. Today, 
they specify business parks, malls, multiplexes and suburban housing 
as indicators of these transformations. In the case of my interlocutors 
who stem from lower and upper middle class families in conservative, 
central Calcutta neighborhoods as well as more “modern” and affluent 
residential areas in the south of the city, urban restructuring initially in-
dicated “progress” as intertwined with “development” through infrastruc-
ture, which was a definition very much prevalent in post-independence 
India up to liberalization. As Khilnani among others has shown, large 
building projects embodied the Nehruvian vision of Indian modernity, 
and thus my interlocutors imagined continuities where they soon were 
to find considerable ruptures.15 
Initially, the materiality of the new city was based on old patterns and 
processes; thus, engineering feats, like the second Hooghly Bridge link-
ing Kolkata with Howrah, its sister across the Ganges and the vast hin-
terland, were celebrated as signifiers of the new era, although its comple-
tion took a phenomenal three decades from laying the foundation stone 
in 1972. A similar nimbus was attached to fly-overs, those ghastly roads 
on stilts that overshadow many of the main arteries and their surround-
ings across the city today. These and several other large-scale infrastruc-
ture projects were still located within the parameters of urban planning, 
15 Khilnani, The Idea of India.
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its execution and its objectives, that had been developed in the aftermath 
of independence. However, curiously, middle class residents welcomed 
the bridges and fly-overs as “progress,” even though at the time no one 
could have foreseen that many of these households would actually be 
able to buy their own cars. Thus, it appeared that, more so than for prac-
tical reasons, fly-overs were seen as triumph of planning over politics 
(the anti-urban bureaucracy and the corruption associated with the Left 
Front by then), and that these new roads redefined spatial relationships 
within the city, bypassing “congested” and “problematic” areas. In a way 
they symbolized the speed at which the new world was materializing 
and where desirable middle class spaces would emerge. 
In Kolkata, like in Delhi and Mumbai, the widening of roads and the 
presence of fly-overs invited further claims to being a “global” city, which 
came to be imagined in the mold of middle class citizens’ ideas about 
American and Southeast-Asian urbanities. As described for other glo-
balizing cities, in Kolkata, the discussion about and imagination of what 
a city for the twenty-first century should look like was not guided by 
solutions for the persisting housing crisis or inefficient educational and 
health provision for the masses. Although some of these issues were ad-
dressed in discussions with foreign donors, including the World Bank, 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the ruling coalition led by the Com-
munist Party of India (Marxist) did continue to address inequality in 
the rural areas, while in the city it concentrated on how to kick-start eco-
nomic regeneration largely in terms of roping in middle class city-dwell-
ers. In spite of the still persisting political reasons that had made rural 
votebanks more attractive in the past, neoliberal policies introduced by 
the Central government and adopted by the states made this priority 
feasible. Thus, by the mid-1990s Calcutta came to be represented as an 
“opportunity,” and the government of West Bengal reluctantly agreed to 
a vision that hinged on a reformed, reordered city that would deliver 
relief from the chronic economic stagnation of the whole state. 
This reorientation was partly triggered by programs funded by the 
Central government and donor agencies, for instance the “Megacity De-
velopment Plan,” and these programs were already designed with a view 
to recuperate investment in urban infrastructure. Thus, they comple-
mented initiatives that focused on the development of a new, clean ser-
vice sector, mostly IT-related industries, while existing manufacturing 
and trade took a back seat.16 Gradually, as neoliberal policies began to 
reshape the political imagination of the public—in this case, the middle 
16 Chakravorty, “From Colonial City”: 64.
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class readership of large newspapers—the city, or rather, urban space, 
came to be seen as an economic resource.17 
Critical scholars of media studies have discussed how “neoliberal 
newspeak” developed as part of digital corporations has transformed the 
way in which economic facts and processes are represented across the 
globe.18 The new fetishization of Kolkata’s cityscape was fuelled by end-
less articles in daily newspapers as well as the newfound voice of private 
TV stations that focused on the desperate state of the city’s roads, on 
corrupt municipal officers, problems with garbage collection, and the 
like. Such reporting often mixed economic facts and planning with en-
tertainment, but was framed by extensive discussions of proposed build-
ing projects, initially those by private-public partnerships, and increas-
ingly projects supported by private investors. Among the projects hailed 
in the press as the advent of a new era were plans, soon to become reality, 
of an entirely state-funded business district set aside for IT-industries, 
intended to attract investors. Related were a variety of larger and small-
er projects, most of which never really materialized, including water-
front regeneration and the extension of the airport, as well as extensive 
transport links to the suburbs and other cities in the state. What did 
emerge, however, were large retail and leisure complexes, and a whole set 
of branded schools and hospitals realized by private investors, most of 
which were built on plots allocated by public bodies. All these projects 
fed into the general, millennial sense of expectation among Kolkata’s 
middle class citizenry, before not so much associated with a gambling 
culture but revelation through partaking in global consumer culture.19 
Although the growing interest in urban development was partly pushed 
by the demands of debtors promoting neoliberal economic solutions 
as part of structural adjustment programs, in the process the political 
clout of the urban middle class did sky-rocket, because their consump-
tion habits drive the production and representation of new urbanities in 
millennial capitalism and produce an economistic view of how to create 
a “modern” city.
17 For a corporate view on the economic viability of urban regeneration and the role of the Indian middle 
class, see Shirish Sankhe et al., “India’s Urban Awakening: Building Inclusive Cities, Sustaining Eco-
nomic Growth,” (Mc Kinsey Global Institute, 2010).
18 See, Paula Chakravartty and Dan Schiller, “Neoliberal Newspeak and Digital Capitalism in Crisis,” In-
ternational Journal of Communication 4 (2010). This article outlines the way in which economic change 
is regularly presented as infotainment and I would suggest this is the chosen form of presentation of 
the new cityscape as well. 
19 In this sense, work on the Indian middle class complements the analysis of the way in which margin-
alized communities are implied in millennial capitalism. See, Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, 
“Millennial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second Coming,” Public Culture 12, no. 2 (2000). 
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In Kolkata and West Bengal as a whole, local planners and bureau-
crats were implied in relation to a political landscape dominated by the 
hegemonic Left Front and worries about votebanks, which linked the 
fate of the city to the fate of its rural hinterland.20 Thus, initially the city 
was reinvented as a future hub for IT-related industries already domi-
nating cities like Bangalore and Hyderabad, with which middle class 
Calcuttans increasingly identified their vision of the future. But soon it 
appeared that for the desired vision of “urban lifestyles” to be selectively 
promoted, Kolkata, as the city was now known, had to expand beyond 
its current boundaries.
The measures implemented to bring about urban regeneration in 
Kolkata—in this context heavily entangled with City Development 
Strategies (CDS) devised and promoted by various funding agencies—
focused heavily on infrastructure, clean industries, and leisure facilities 
(including heritage centers and amusement parks). But after the first 
large-scale set of projects had been implemented, planning permissions 
for local entrepreneurs to set up hospitals, schools, and retail facilities or 
to build vast residential complexes were waved through. While the first 
round of investment was planned and realized through the favorite ve-
hicle of neoliberal economists, the private-public partnership, these were 
soon overtaken by private initiatives, most prominently engaged in real 
estate, retail markets and upstart businesses. Thus, what started with a 
substantial injection of government-initiated development has become 
to my interlocutors intertwined with local enterprise, as circuits of capi-
tal have become more and more about private companies siphoning off 
subsidies and harnessing government-funded advantages. 
With a view to the urban landscape the ever-growing consumerism 
that has finally engulfed the city, in particular the emergence of new cen-
ters for up-market retail operations, is physically, in its materiality and in 
terms of its representation, seen in the same light as the increasing pres-
ence of private providers of healthcare and education. In other words, 
when describing and discussing urban change, my interlocutors would 
see shopping malls and middle class housing complexes along the same 
lines, as the processes that made them possible, the personnel involved 
and the target group were apparently the same. 
The current, second phase of neoliberal urban restructuring focuses 
on the process of wild suburbanization, which is also found in all other 
Indian metros. Triggered by the promise of fast returns, investors en-
20 This link of the city with its hinterland is crucial where urban politics and economies are concerned, 
as Ananya Roy has shown. See, Ananya Roy, City Requiem, Calcutta: Gender and the Politics of Poverty 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002).
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sured the rapid construction of whole new suburbs, which are equipped 
with a host of facilities that cater to the lifestyles of the newly affluent 
segment of the middle class. Suburbs are of course not new in India, and 
earlier satellites like the Salt Lake township were provided by the state to 
mostly middle class residents. However, although the new townships—
the most prominent one appropriately named New Town in English, 
but Rajarhat in Bengali—have a very different trajectory, they started 
out on the same premise. But driven by investments, rather than need 
for housing, New Town is not developed by the municipality or even the 
state government, but is in fact realized by a combination of bureaucrats, 
property speculators and (often imaginary) investors, who are publicly 
held responsible for the original plans.21 
The global city image demanded a reordering of existing spaces as 
well, and thus since the 1990s a series of transformations have ensured 
that my middle class interlocutors see the city center in a more positive 
light. As pointed out above, Delhi’s claim to become a restructured, truly 
global city rested on the eviction of slum-dwellers and squatters and the 
almost complete erasure of informal sector activities from the city cen-
ter. This has not (yet) happened in Kolkata, a city famous for its large 
bustees (slums), which have co-existed with middle class housing since 
its inception. 
However, subtle and less subtle attempts to rid the city of undesirable 
elements, be this residents of squatter colonies on public land, or the 
activities of the urban poor that sustain them and satisfy middle class 
demands for cheap services and goods alike, have been implemented. 
Firstly, “polluting industries” were charted and then made illegal and re-
located—often, as in the well-documented case of the leather industry 
that occupied prime real estate near the city center—after long, drawn-
out court cases and through payment of massive amounts of publicly 
funded compensation.22 While their removal did diminish employment 
opportunities for the urban poor in the area, middle class investors and 
potential buyers did in turn benefit from this investment of public re-
sources. My interlocutors, who had never been bothered by the existence 
of this admittedly ill-regulated and polluting industry, did however wel-
come the removal of the tanneries and other, smaller industries from 
what were potentially residential areas for “respectable people.” At the 
21 See, Xiangming Chen et al., “Localizing the Production of Global Cities: A Comparison of New Town 
Developments around Shanghai and Kolkata,” City & Community 8, no. 4 (2009).
22 See, Hans Dembowski, Taking the State to Court: Public Interest Litigation and the Public Sphere in 
Metropolitan India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). The way the public sphere is constructed 
in contemporary Kolkata has, however, radically changed in the meantime.
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same time their definition of what kind of economic areas should be 
extended to encourage “growth” resembled the classic profile of desirable 
middle class employment, namely white-collar office work, to be found 
in IT-related industries alone.23 Thus, investment in this sector facilitat-
ed two related processes that roped the middle class in as supporters of 
urban regeneration: firstly, it made it possible to imagine alternatives to 
government employment, but keep the emphasis on white-collar office 
work for graduates, and secondly IT-enabled industries came to symbol-
ize the more globalized lifestyles that middle class Kolkatans associated 
with desirable cityscapes like Bangalore or Hyderabad. 
Soon the rhetorically created and economically viable void that the 
absence of a comprehensive plan for economic renewal created allowed 
large players to monopolize the most lucrative slices of contracts, in-
stitutions, and human capital. Not all of these were multi-nationals, 
but my interlocutors, fed a steady diet of success stories in the media, 
had mostly paid attention to the presence of multi-national enterprises, 
such as Infosys. Soon the most respected of Indian companies and some 
multi-nationals had cherry-picked the real estate on offer in the newly 
designated “Sector V,” a part of the satellite township of Salt Lake, which 
with its glitzy new buildings and distance from the hurly-burly of the 
rest of Kolkata signified a new era of urbane working arrangements. 
Again, the discourse of needs for the global city dominated the narrative 
related to these townships, which were designed for co-operations, who 
in turn “promised” to establish branches in the city. 
In direct contrast to what working-class communities experienced 
here and in other Indian cities—“all that is solid melts into air”—middle 
class citizens were taken by the neoliberal doctrines of self-made men, 
of global markets, and of lifestyles promoted in relation to “merit” and 
scientific progress, which took on a realistic quality in these townships. 
It was never suggested by my interlocutors that the pact whereby local 
government makes the promises of corporate capital materialize would 
result in anything but a global city. The utopian quality of these politics 
were most potently symbolized by buildings—for example, those that 
make up the mostly new landscape of work in townships like Rajarhat, 
where large towers made from steel and glass are coming up and the bill-
boards reference vast corporations with a worldwide appeal. 
23 There is of course a distinction here between Bengali middle class preferences for white-collar em-
ployment opportunities and the traditional preferences among members of the business communi-
ties in the city. The latter’s urban experience did not play a very prominent role in the official reimagin-
ing of the city, although they dominate the sectors that came to boom during the second phase of 
urban restructuring and have certainly benefitted from the new environment.
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With new sites of work in evidence, though not necessarily at the 
center of the local economy, the idea of the middle class as a driving force 
behind urban change in West Bengal has come to the fore. In the course 
of these developments other sites became equally significant, initially 
because they shared the material qualities of the shiny cooperate world. 
Thus, desirable hospitals and schools coming up on new plots, desig-
nated for the use of consortiums running such facilities also in other 
cities, resemble four-star hotels, whereas four-star hotels are designed 
to emulate the imagery of hyper-modernism modeled in global business 
districts across the world. 
And finally, residential areas emerged in places where ten years ago 
not even roads existed, which also reflects the yearning of the middle 
class to tie into global Lifestyles that like those elsewhere appeal to an 
aspirational mode of middle class consumerism.24 Although most of the 
developments are rather mundane affairs, they are imagined through 
the outstanding publicity that flashy designer developments are given. 
Unlike in Delhi, most of these developments are not gated, with the re-
ally luxury ones mostly promoted to the expat (Non-Resident-Indian) 
category of customers. However, even apartments in the least appeal-
ing, non-gated, three-story bloc on a main road are sold along the same 
lines—that is, as a status symbol and investment in the future of the 
children, as a guarantor of “suitably modern” and middle class lifestyles.25 
The “new” urban middle class
As Mazzarella has stated, the middle class has by now come to be repre-
sented mostly in terms of consumerist lifestyles, and talk about the mid-
dle class has become an “obsessive public concern.”26 However, contrary 
to representations of the middle class, this talk did and still does involve 
a profound critique of transformations that threaten institutions and 
relationships associated with the morality and sociality that the middle 
class has by and large come to associate with modernity. While the neo-
liberal version of this concern with the middle class associated it with 
24 See, Brosius, India’s Middle Class; Veronique Dupont, “The Idea of a New Chic Delhi through Publicity 
Hype,” in The Idea of Delhi, ed. Roma Khosla (Mumbai: Marg Publications, 2005).
25 Mark Liechty has discussed the establishment of a middle class in Nepal as a “cultural project” that 
is based on suitably modern identities in his monograph on Nepal’s capital Kathmandu. See, Mark 
Liechty, Suitably Modern: Making Middle-Class Culture in a New Consumer Society (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2003).
26 See, William Mazzarella, “Indian Middle Class,” in Keywords in South Asian Studies, eds. Gita Dharam-
pal-Frick, et al. (Delhi: Oxford University Press, n.d.). Mazzarella’s ethnography of advertisement 
professionals and the gradual shift of much advertising in cities towards the growing middle class 
consumer are charted in Shoveling Smoke. 
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consumerism—defined in relation to markets and emphasizing the pos-
sibilities of a liberalized economy—my interlocutors were mostly wary 
of these easy assumptions about how their lives would be enriched and 
transformed. Yet, they agreed that the new era provided more and more 
citizens with “opportunities” and “choices,” as individuals would realize 
their true “selves” and would be “rewarded” through increasing affluence. 
Whole industries, for instance the advertisement industry and Bolly-
wood films feed into what Fernandes has called the “cultural visibility” 
of the middle class consumer, but this should not lead us to believe that 
we are dealing with a homogenous group or, for that matter, an entirely 
new set of values and lifestyles.27 
It appears that, if we look at a specific section of the middle class in 
the context of regional histories and actual practices, there can be no 
doubt that urbanites with high disposable incomes in booming cities 
define themselves through participation in the neoliberal political proj-
ect and cite the “market” as an indicator of progress and development. 
They also partake in consumer cultures that are rather homogenous and 
tie in with globally recognizable patterns of education, occupation and 
consumption. But at the same time these links and flows are determined 
by processes of stratification which rewrite how middle class lives are 
lived and how being middle class as a cultural project directed towards 
the reproduction of privileges is experienced.28 
Unlike what we are told by the media and social scientists, public con-
sumption practices, and histories of nationalism, whereby the “new” In-
dian middle class is reconstituted in the literature as a valid trope, do not 
fully reflect the experience of these transitions.29 The few ethnographies 
that cover the critical period of the 1990s, years during which structural 
and ideological changes altered what being middle class entailed, register 
the utmost resentment with which economic reform and the ideology 
attached to it were met. Thus, in my own research and in the work of 
Ganguly-Scrase and Scrase it is apparent that among the supposed win-
ners of liberalization, namely the middle class, large sections reacted in 
a hostile manner to neoliberal reform, which hit those dependent on 
27 See, Leela Fernandes, “The Politics of Forgetting: Class Politics, State Power and the Restructuring of 
Urban Space in India,” Urban Studies 41, no. 12 (2004). 
28 This is evident if the notion of the urban is extended beyond the metropolis and the rural elites are 
taken into account as well. See, Henrike Donner, ed. Being Middle Class: A Way of Life (London: Rout-
ledge, 2011). 
29 See, Mazzarella, Shoveling Smoke; Arjun Appadurai and Carol A. Breckenridge, “Public Modernity 
in India,” in Consuming Modernity: Public Culture in a South Asian World, ed. Carol A. Breckenridge 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995); Ritty A. Lukose, Liberalization’s Children: Gender, 
Youth, and Consumer Citizenship in Globalizing India (Durham: Duke University, 2009).
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the massive state sector in West Bengal very hard indeed.30 Within the 
neoliberal rhetoric much has been made of middle class gain, even in the 
backwater that is Kolkata. While it would be very difficult to prove that 
the urban middle class constituted a conscious raison d’être initiating 
these processes, it became clear that urban restructuring was catering to 
the needs of this hegemonic group. However, certain particularities that 
make for a slightly different take on the relationship between the middle 
class and neoliberal politics need to be pointed out here. 
In West Bengal, a Communist-led coalition government had been in 
charge until they lost the government to the populist leader Mamata Ba-
nerjee and her Trinamul Congress in 2011, and it was during the previous 
two decades that most of the policies considered in this article were put 
into place. Bengal’s history is marked by the emergence of a middle class 
among the Bengali-speaking section of the population during the colo-
nial period, and it is this middle class which has been dominating poli-
tics in the state since independence. During its reign, the Left Front on 
the one hand created a class of loyal public servants from 1977 onwards, 
which drew on the long-standing and self-conscious history of this “old,” 
Bengali-speaking middle class, but largely ignored urban development 
and the needs and demands of urban voters in general. Thus, Left Front 
hegemony was built on the values and support of a certain section of the 
middle class, a section that subscribed to a developmentalist state, as long 
as the redistribution of resources did not extend to the redistribution of 
salaried jobs, and settled for a relatively secure but austere lifestyle. 
Thus, unlike in other cities, where a “new” middle class, consisting 
of upwardly mobile communities and individuals capitalizing on novel 
opportunities, came into being, Kolkata’s fate (so far) has been decided 
in relation to existing class relations and a model of development that 
favors the state as a main provider of opportunities. Furthermore, the 
politics of the city, which are closely intertwined with its social structure 
only move very gradually away from a model in which access to state re-
sources depended on the interdependence of working-class and middle 
class politics.31 
Partly driven by the threat of disinvestment in the state sector, which 
threatened middle class lifestyles and privileges as well as the survival of 
30 See, Ganguly-Scrase and Scrase, Globalization and the Middle Classes; Henrike Donner, Domestic God-
desses: Maternity, Globalization and Middle-Class Identity in Contemporary India (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2008); Margit van Wessel, “Talking About Consumption: How an Indian Middle Class Dissociates 
from Middle-Class Life,” Cultural Dynamics 16, no. 1 (2004).
31 See, Partha Chatterjee, “Are Indian Cities Becoming Bourgeois at Last?,” in The Politics of the Gov-
erned: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).
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the poor, and partly driven by their involvement in local politics, it took 
the Kolkata middle class, or more precisely its hegemonic Bengali sec-
tion, a decade to join the shared vision of a post-liberalization India in 
which local social relations would no longer dominate everyday politics 
and lives. Secondly, what was felt acutely and has hampered the rapid 
progress of class formation along the lines of shared lifestyles and na-
tional identity is that, maybe more so in Kolkata than in other metros, 
the processes that might be seen as producing a new class through a 
shared cultural project that identifies middle class lifestyles as the de-
fining factor are marred by inconsistencies, contradictions, and uneven-
ness. Thus, stratification as much as collective representation and iden-
tification, and new intra-class relations are seen as defining the new era. 
Segregation and exclusion 
Writing about neoliberal regimes and their impact on social relations, 
anthropologist Aihwa Ong has suggested that neoliberal policies are 
constituted by a redefinition of groups “in relation to market forces” 
through “zoning technologies [that] have carved special spaces in order 
to achieve [this] strategic goal.”32 In the case of urban restructuring in 
Kolkata, the policies that facilitated this shift consisted of the margin-
alization of the urban poor and the categorization of populations and 
places in terms of their productivity of desirable urban space. Catering 
to the needs of the increasingly car-owning middle class, for example, 
fly-overs became a potent symbol of the free flow, convenience and speed 
of the lifestyle envisaged and aspired to by those who have achieved. 
However, they do at the same time diminish road space for “undesirable” 
vehicles and activities now marked as encroachers (rickshaws, squatters, 
hawkers and the like) and link desirable spaces in the city—for example, 
the suburbs consisting of middle class housing and workplaces with the 
commercial and retail spaces of central Kolkata. 
What applies to transport can also be extended to the question of 
housing and work in the new city: as squatters were evicted and slum 
settlements commodified, the government began to promote suburban 
developments in the form of public-private partnerships, thereby selling 
off land to private developers through deals that ultimately benefitted a 
select public. 
After entire townships that were designed to attract investors and 
clean industries had been up for grabs, the new developments added 
32 See, Aihwa Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignity (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2006), 7.
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large tracts of land to the growing portfolio of opportunities offered to 
the local middle class. At the same time, the opportunities available to 
the working poor, be that housing or livelihoods, were diminishing. The 
informal sector and often residing in public space were criminalized— a 
politics made visible for example, when hawkers were cleared from some 
of the main crossings in Kolkata during the infamous “Operation Sun-
shine” in 1996.33 
As has been argued for other urban settings, for instance, the cases of 
Delhi or İstanbul, social segregation according to class is part and parcel 
of the remaking of cities into global cities. It is accomplished through the 
introduction of spatially segregated, often gated and surveillance-domi-
nated residential, work and leisure environments that serve the needs of 
middle class citizens, and within which others—the working poor—are 
only allowed access for the purpose of serving these needs.34
Furthermore, this privileging of the needs and rights of middle class 
consumers does extend beyond the city and demand a restructuring of 
the relationship between the city and its hinterland. Across the state, 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) that have emerged include sites as 
diverse as the new Kolkata township of Sector V, dedicated to clean 
industries, and the rural areas of Singur and Nandigram, which were 
intended for industrial development.35 What makes these sites excep-
tional is not only the fact that they are defined as quasi out of bounds 
for unions, but that their existence is driven by middle class desires in 
a new consumer-citizen-driven political economy. In the case of Sector 
V, the whole township was developed to attract high-profile investors 
and to provide appropriate and respectable jobs for high-earning middle 
33 In this event, officers of the police and representatives of the municipality forcibly evicted hawkers 
from major crossings. The presence of heavily unionized hawkers on the streets of Kolkata has been 
a political issue from the 1960s onwards, as Bandyopadhyay’s article shows, Ritajyoti Bandyopadhyay, 
“Hawkers’ Movement in Kolkata,” Economic and Political Weekly 44, no. 17 (2009). “Operation Sun-
shine” became infamous because it signaled the beginning of a phase during which the criminaliza-
tion of poor populations began to play a significant role in local politics. The forcible removal of poor 
residents and communities had been almost unheard of in Calcutta since the 1970s. The hawkers 
resisted their resettlement in newly designed “markets” in the suburbs and subsequently reoccupied 
their lucrative inner-city sites. In fact, Kolkata has recently (in 2011) seen a massive increase in hawk-
ers, allegedly because the Trinamul party, like the Left Front before it, rewarded party workers with new 
slots. 
34 For Delhi, see Brosius, India’s Middle Class; for İstanbul see Ayfer Bartu-Candan and Biray Kolluoğlu, 
“Emerging Spaces of Neoliberalism: A Gated Town and Public Housing Project in İstanbul,” New 
Perspectives on Turkey, no. 39 (2008).
35 Singur and Nandigram are rural sites where compulsory purchases of land were planned in order 
to erect Special Economic Zones (SEZs). The struggles ensuing contributed to the downfall of the 
Left Front in the elections in 2011 and helped the populist leader Mamata Banerjee and her Trinamul 
Congress Party come to power.
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class workforces. In the case of the latter two sites, the symbolic role 
of the outside investors (the Indian multinational Tata and the Indo-
nesian Salim corporation, respectively), and in the case of Singur, the 
product (an affordable car for the growing Indian market) were of equal 
importance. By reflecting global standards in overcoming local political 
obstacles, such as the omnipresence of unions for which West Bengal is 
famous, the government did in the view of my interlocutors of different 
political persuasions provide a new perspective for the “future” and paid 
tribute to the demands of the “market.”36
Furthermore, it is the massive expansion of middle class consumer-
ism—most obviously shopping, eating out and other leisure pursuits, 
but also the growing market for private education and healthcare—
which has reconfigured urban politics. While the impact of such up-
market undertakings as luxury apartments and interior designers, five-
star hotels and leisure enclaves in the literature on the new middle class 
is vastly exaggerated,37 there can be no doubt that even my less affluent 
interlocutors are partaking in new consumption practices that tie in with 
the narrative of a global middle class lifestyle. With these new patterns, 
new sites for the pursuit of leisure activities, socializing, well-being and 
education have become part of family life and are increasingly substitut-
ing for other sites of self-fashioning; this familiarity breeds acceptance 
of a new politics of urban space which is often marked by dispossession 
and exclusion. 
In Kolkata few would generally argue in favor of the permanent re-
moval of bustees and hawkers, or for the eviction of squatters from pub-
lic land. But one way the rhetoric and politics through which exclusion-
ary politics of urban space have become acceptable is through talk about 
the “environment.” As a range of scholars have pointed out, the discourse 
accompanying the newly prominent notion of the “environment” plays 
an important role in the neoliberal policies employed to facilitate the 
restructuring of urban space in India.38 Many of the dreamscapes, the 
aspirational spaces that have popularized middle class lifestyles much 
beyond the above-mentioned de facto section, are advertised as clean and 
green, and school children are routinely engaged in “cleaning up drives,” 
36 It goes without saying that the success these initiatives had among my middle class interlocutors did 
not contradict their preference for a new government. None suggested that they agreed with the anti-
industrialization stance of the protesters in Singur or Nandigram. 
37 See for instance Brosius, India’s Middle Class. 
38 See, Amita Baviskar, “Cows, Cars and Cycle-Rickshaws: Bourgeois Environmentalism and the Battle 
for Delhi’s Streets,” in Elite and Everyman: The Cultural Politics of the Indian Middle Classes, eds. Amita 
Baviskar and Raka Ray (Delhi: Routledge, 2011); Emma Mawdsley, “India’s Middle Classes and the 
Environment,” Development and Change 35, no. 1 (2004).
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which is ironic as Kolkata must have one of the most successful guaran-
tors of recycling in abundance, namely poor labor. 
Environmental concerns reflect middle class anxieties related to ur-
ban space and class-specific ideas about public and private spaces, purity 
and pollution; they feed into desires for segregation, as the street repre-
sents a site of chaos, lower castes and classes and pollution, as Kaviraj has 
shown.39 Furthermore, they tie in with efforts of nation-building, at their 
lowest level drawing on older pedagogies and politics that were promoted 
by the state and that propagated a respect for nature, often using Hindu 
symbolism and terminology, in order to promote good citizenship. 
These earlier systems of belief find new outlets in campaigns that 
unite the agencies of the state and middle class citizens, more often than 
not led by upper middle class spokespersons, who claim political con-
trol over urban spaces now that middle class concerns are again on the 
agenda, even where the poor were able to pull their weight as voters in 
the past. Often practical considerations, for example the flow of traf-
fic at busy crossings, as in the above-mentioned “Operation Sunshine,” 
drive such campaigns, which are initiated by state agencies in an attempt 
to make cities more manageable, but the idiom of the “environment,” of 
“congestion” and of “pollution” mobilize on the basis of prevalent fears 
of contamination. Naturally, the activities and personnel removed from 
public space are not the middle class drivers, who clog up every available 
space in busy streets around shopping centers, schools and hospitals, 
but activities that the urban poor carry out in the “interstices” of the city. 
The above-mentioned examples of “Operation Sunshine,” the drive to 
curb hawking on busy crossings, or the removal of tanneries are telling 
examples of this new politics of class, and so are the rules that govern 
access and settlement in middle class suburbs.
The discourse on the environment is only one among a set of dis-
courses that have changed the way in which my interlocutors see the 
city and have modified their rhetoric in order to make the ideal of the 
global city their own. From what has been said so far it is apparent that 
processes of segregation according to class limit access to specific plac-
es in the city and that access to such spaces provides a public measure 
of social status and success within a great new world of opportunities. 
Thus, while narratives of urban transformation that put speakers in spe-
cific places are always narratives of desirable “modern” selves, especially 
among the young, good citizenship, which bestows rights to the city, is 
39 See, Sudipta Kaviraj, “Filth and the Public Sphere: Concepts and Practices About Space in Calcutta,” 
Public Culture 10, no. 1 (1997).
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reserved for middle class individuals. As my own research reveals, the re-
lation of citizenship, of the very diversified usage of spaces for consump-
tion, education, and healthcare, and the way in which the experience of 
these spaces—the place-making—ties in with complex and multi-fac-
eted ideas about selves, social relations and politics, differs according to 
social location even within the self-confessed middle class segment of 
the population.40 As processes of exclusion become more permanent, for 
example in education or access to employment, lower middle class Kol-
katans are contesting the new order and become involved in sporadic, 
but nevertheless persistent protests against the fragmentation of urban 
space and social relationships.41 
Lastly, the reordering of urban space not only affects the relations 
between classes, but also reshapes intra-class relations. This is particu-
larly apparent in relation to the ways in which global consumer culture 
is appropriated and understood—that is, the way in which the global is 
localized. In Kolkata, two arenas are bringing these processes of stratifi-
cation and class formation out very prominently, namely healthcare and 
education. In both cases it is not only obvious that the new opportu-
nities are mostly benefitting the increasingly globally connected upper 
middle class (professionals, top government servants, businessmen), but 
it is also apparent that the relationship with the state is largely medi-
ated by the experience of access to institutions and infrastructure. Thus 
the cityscape and the ongoing transformation serve here as a metaphor 
for opportunities (markets), which are intertwined with complex ideas 
about “modern” selves, citizenship and social relations that my interlocu-
tors see as facilitated by the state through the planning, execution and 
supervision of urban restructuring for the benefit of middle class resi-
dents.
Conclusion 
As can be discerned from the above, urban India has changed dramati-
cally in the aftermath of liberalization, and urban space has become 
40 See, Henrike Donner, “Labour, Privatisation, and Class: Middle-Class Women’s Experience of Chang-
ing Hospital Births in Calcutta,” in Reproductive Agency and the State: Cultural Transformations in Child-
bearing, ed. Maya Unnithan-Kumar (Oxford: Berghahn, 2004); “Children Are Capital, Grandchildren 
Are Interest: Changing Educational Strategies and Kin-Relations in Calcutta Middle-Class Families,” 
in Globalizing India: Perspectives from Below, eds. Jackie Assayag and Chris Fuller (London: Anthem 
Press, 2005); “New Vegetarianism: Food, Gender and Neo-Liberal Regimes in Bengali Middle-Class 
Families,” South Asia 31, no. 1 (2008).
41 This is reflected in the increasing number of incidents where citizens take action against rogue de-
velopers and those running sub-standard services, as well as a growing number of labor disputes in 
sectors like banking.
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a major resource in the debates around India’s integration into world 
markets.42 The newfound interest in Indian cities has brought a sea 
change in policies, with an emphasis not so much on regeneration but 
an entire rewriting of urban space. The accompanying processes of evic-
tion, alienation and segregation have been charted by activists and social 
scientists,43 and are more often than not described as what Harvey has 
termed “accumulation by dispossession,”44 which leaves the urban poor 
desperate and benefits the middle class. As I have shown, the latter play 
a pivotal role in these transformations not only as drivers of economic 
initiatives, or as benefactors of infrastructure and opportunity, but as 
producers of urbanities drawing on global consumer cultures and local 
histories. In the process, the city of Kolkata is re-imagined in terms of 
middle class aspirations, whereby the fiction of “progress” through urban 
development is superimposed on processes that have led to a fragmenta-
tion of social relationships across urban space. 
While class-based debates about urban space are not new in Kolkata, 
and have played out on the big screen, often culminating in commu-
nal riots in the past, and more recently as a result of what Kaviraj has 
called the democratization of public space,45 what has changed is not 
only the idea of who has rights to the city, but also the kind of politics 
that allow different communities to realize these rights. As Chatterjee 
has observed, since neoliberal regimes have found their way into every-
day conversations and the governance of the city, the ongoing segrega-
tion between the lives of middle class and working-class Kolkatans has 
changed the way in which politics works. Earlier neighborhoods were 
rarely homogenous and middle class residents and slum dwellers lived in 
close proximity, which made for a politics of cooperation and an, albeit 
often unequal, sharing of resources. In the past, this interdependence 
provided the urban poor with a voice, one mediated by “respectable” resi-
dents, whereas today, with processes of spatial segregation in evidence, 
the urban poor have rarely direct access to power.46 
42 See, Sankhe et al., “India’s Urban Awakening: Building Inclusive Cities, Sustaining Economic Growth.”
43 This is reflected in the many debates around these themes that have appeared in Economic and Politi-
cal Weekly over the last two decades.
44 See, David Harvey, The New Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
45 Various authors have discussed how segregation in Calcutta did not entail the emergence of a pub-
lic sphere related to urban public sites in the same way as it was the case in European cities. For a 
detailed analysis of the way in which class-based turned into ethnic segregation in the course of the 
riots before independence, see Suranajan Das, Communal Riots in Bengal, 1905-1947 (Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1993). Middle class notions of public space and post-independence approaches to 
public sites are discussed in Kaviraj, “Filth and the Public Sphere”; Dipesh Chakrabarty, “Open Space/
Public Space: Garbage, Modernity and India,” South Asia 14, no. 1 (1994).
46 See, Chatterjee, “Indian Cities.”
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It appears that the reordering of urban space in the case of post-lib-
eralization India is very much driven by middle class desires, the realiza-
tion of which involves a top-down approach, whereby a nexus of experts 
(planners), bureaucrats, politicians and private investors focus on proj-
ects indexing a “global city” status and where local regeneration follows 
suit. The reordering of urban space does not stop with the development 
of infrastructure and townships benefitting middle class citizens, it also 
manifests itself in the importance of the hinterland in the wider schemes 
of the neoliberal economic politics employed. As urban scholars have 
suggested,47 it might be now more appropriate to speak of the “metro-
politan region” rather than the city, a notion that would also allow us to 
see some of the policies implemented in the context of the federal state 
(West Bengal) and transforming rural landscape.48 The new townships 
as well as the Special Economic Zones both challenged older notions of 
development and represent what Ong has called “zones of exception.”49 
Not only are they exceptionally homogenous, they are financed through 
private developers—local, national, and international—while the acqui-
sition and development of large tracts of land continues to be a state-
regulated process, bringing in new social and economic contestations. 
Thus, as Chen et al. have argued, such projects draw on different kinds 
of planning processes and sets of assumptions than earlier developmen-
talist efforts and belong to the repertoire of sites that are intended to 
mold Kolkata into a global city. 50 
The image of a global city is widely influential among the middle 
class in Kolkata and allows for the privatization of ever larger stretches 
of urban space to go unchallenged. But while it is widely assumed that 
liberalization and urban restructuring benefitted the Indian middle class 
on the whole, more often than not because only economic indicators are 
taken as proof, neoliberal policies also challenge intra-class relations, as 
sections of the middle class are stripped of their privileges and lose social 
security. There are therefore processes of stratification at work, which 
bring some of the contradictions inherent in neoliberal regimes and the 
values promoted into the open. This is particularly pertinent in the case 
of Kolkata’s middle class, which is not only differentiated vertically, but 
47 This argument has been made by, among others, Soja and Kanai. See, Edward Soja and Miguel Kanai, 
“The Urbanization of the World,” in The Endless City, eds. Ricky Burdett and Dejan Sudjic (London: 
Phaidon, 2007).
48 For an attempt to theorize the way in which rural and urban economies are intertwined and how 
displacement, migration and inter-class relations are constitutive of the particular urban politics of 
Calcutta, see Roy, City Requiem.
49 Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception.
50 See, Chen et al., “Localizing the Production of Global Cities.”
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also horizontally, between different ethnic and religious groups with dis-
tinct positions in the urban spatial order and therefore variable degrees 
of control over the ongoing reordering of urban spatial relations. 
While the ideology of self-government and individualism and the 
ideal of the entrepreneur are embraced in the media and in popular dis-
course, the notion of entitlements depends still largely on the relation-
ship with the state in other sections. 
As Chatterjee has suggested, Kolkata has finally become “bourgeois,” 
and the middle classes have staked a new claim to the city, partly through 
disengaging from local politics, but at the same time reengaging with 
state politics.51 But unlike what Harriss has suggested for urban India 
in general, politics has not been left entirely to the poor; therefore, we 
need to establish what the new politics of the city consists of.52 Not only 
does the middle class imagination constitute an active interpretation of 
what is happening—for example, the uproar that occurs each time poli-
ticians, developers and administrators are shown to be in cahoots with 
each other and a project fails, a building collapses, and so on—but as 
social scientists we also have to pay more attention to processes of plan-
ning, of financing and implementation, as well as transformations of the 
legal domain. Whole tracts of urban space—in Kolkata, for example, 
the former docks and the slums surrounding them—were irrelevant for 
middle class citizens in the past, the political imagination of the pow-
erful middle class has been shown to actively facilitate a re-evaluation 
of entire sites, whereby the global lifestyle of this class is projected on 
supposedly unproductive urban space, which is seen as empty: an op-
portunity for investment. 
Within this framework, citizenship and rights to the city are also 
linked to the individual embodiment of neoliberal values rather than 
solely market-driven politics, and the core institutions of middle class 
life, the family and gender relations are reformed accordingly. For mid-
dle class urbanites, neoliberalism as a technology of governmentality has 
made exclusionary practices, which are largely spatial, more important, 
as social relationships are subjected to an ideology of self-interest and 
the maximization of profits. Thus, being middle class implies that large 
sections of Kolkata’s population identify with multiple, privileged glob-
51 See, Partha Chatterjee, The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 142.
52 John Harriss has recently suggested that the poor are forced to resort to politics, while the middle 
class access resources by other means. This suggests a rather narrow view of what urban politics are 
about. See, John Harriss, “Antinomies of Empowerment: Observations on Civil Society, Politics and 
Urban Governance in India,” Economic and Political Weekly 42, no. 26 (2007).
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al locations and can increasingly take part in Indian and other locales, 
without even having to move from their Kolkata homes. The way in 
which the city is experienced and imagined is increasingly framed with 
reference to transnational and regional identities, which are laboriously 
constructed through everyday practices. It is in this sense that everyday 
practice “recast[s] the middle class citizen as a central agent for the revi-
sioning of the Indian nation in the context of globalization.”53 In other 
words, the shared everyday reproduction of middle class cultural imagi-
nations including the experience of urban space makes middle class lives 
in South Asia, and indeed beyond, comparable and the space of a glo-
balized Indian middle class culture coherent. This coherence is prob-
ably more recent than the continuities of some themes suggest: in spite 
of dissent, once established, the increase in affluence in the cities and 
some regions in the wake of liberalization helped to bring the idea of the 
middle class as a driver of urban development into new terrains. Both its 
political imagery and its everyday practices of place-making account for 
entirely new spatial relations. 
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